If managers have the power to determine their own compensation, the only limit to managerial rent extraction is the threat of dismissal by shareholders. Shareholder intervention is, however, problematic for two reasons. First, replacing an entrenched manager is costly. And second, the information required to evaluate the need for intervention is, to a large extent, provided by the manager. This paper presents a model of shareholder intervention with these two ingredients. The model shows that making intervention less costly for shareholders leads to more frequent shareholder intervention in equilibrium and to more information revelation by the manager. However, it also has the perverse effect of reducing the manager's incentives to take the profit-maximizing action.
In publicly held corporations, shareholders' power to replace the board of directors is the ultimate guarantor of managerial incentives. Although shareholders delegate the supervision of management to the board of directors, they retain the right to vote out the board if they consider that it is not fulfilling its monitoring and advisory duties. While shareholders have not extensively exercised this role in the past (see, e.g., Bebchuk 2007) , shareholder action has received a great deal of attention in recent years, partly because of the perception that shareholders' influence on the behavior of directors and executives has been growing, and partly because of the deep concern about the governance of U.S. corporations that has followed the wave of corporate scandals of the early 2000s. This paper aims to shed light on the debate about shareholder activism by developing a model of shareholder intervention and its effects on managerial compensation and incentives.
In principle, firm executives can be provided the right incentives by means of optimally designed compensation contracts. The provision of incentives to executives by means of their compensation contracts, however, faces important obstacles. Most importantly, compensation contracts are not set by shareholders themselves but, rather, by the board of directors, which is, at best, an imperfect agent of shareholders and, at worst, controlled by the manager. Therefore, compensation contracts may not be designed with the goal of shareholder value maximization and, in the worst cases, may, in fact, be mechanisms for managerial rent extraction. Moreover, the performance measures that determine the manager's pay are either directly provided by the management team (accounting measures) or affected by the information provided by management (market measures). Therefore, the manager may have strong incentives to manipulate the information provided to shareholders. 1 Although the problem may be ameliorated by auditors and market analysts, firm performance may be hard to verify and the variables used to measure it may be only weakly related to actual performance. As a result of these difficulties, compensation contracts may not be effective in providing the right incentives to executives.
To reflect the difficulties of providing incentives to executives via compensation contracts and in order to focus on the role of shareholder activism in shaping managerial behavior, the model developed in this paper assumes that the manager is effectively in control of setting her own compensation. In this context, the only limit to managerial rent extraction is the threat of shareholder intervention: if shareholders are not satisfied with the return offered to them by the manager, they can exercise their rights of control over the firm and intervene to remove her.
Two main barriers, however, hinder shareholder intervention. The first one is that, in publicly held corporations, replacing the incumbent management team is very costly. If the board is on the manager's side, disgruntled shareholders have to elect a new board in order to replace the manager, and doing so is extremely costly (see Bebchuk 2007 for an account of the costs involved in challenging incumbent directors). 2 The costs of intervention are further compounded by the presence of severe free-rider problems. On the one hand, the costs of staging an electoral challenge to the incumbent management team are borne only by the shareholders who undertake the challenge, while the benefits are shared with all shareholders. On the other hand, the incentives for information acquisition prior to voting may also be small, since the costs of acquiring and evaluating information are privately borne, while the benefits of an informed vote are shared with all shareholders. The second obstacle to shareholder intervention has to do with the information upon which shareholders can base their intervention decisions. In order to decide whether to intervene to replace the manager, shareholders need to assess the expected returns from intervention. However, this assessment requires information about the firm's state and prospects that is, to a large extent, provided by the incumbent manager (Jensen 1993, p. 864 ). These two obstacles to shareholder intervention are incorporated in the model presented here. On the one hand, I assume that shareholder intervention entails costs, which are labeled control costs. On the other hand, it is assumed that the only information that shareholders can access to evaluate the need for intervention is the profit reported by the manager.
The model addresses three main questions. First, what is the effect of control costs on the probability of costly shareholder intervention? Second, how does the level of control costs affect the relationship between shareholder returns and actual firm performance? Or, put differently, how is the informativeness of reported profits related to the level of control costs?
And, third, how do these elements interact to shape the manager's incentives? The model shows that greater costs of control reduce the probability of shareholder intervention and the information about true performance revealed by the returns received by shareholders. These changes, however, have the effect of improving managerial incentives. The explanation for this perhaps counterintuitive result is that as control costs increase and shareholder intervention becomes less likely, shareholders benefit less from firm success. But the other side of a reduction of the sensitivity of shareholders' returns to true performance is an increase of the responsiveness of the manager's pay to that performance, and this increased performance-pay sensitivity strengthens the manager's incentives to maximize firm value. A simple example may clarify this point: if the manager were to offer shareholders the same return irrespectively of revenues, she would effectively become the residual earner, and, thus, her objective would be to maximize value.
Given the emphasis on compensation contracts that characterizes the research on managerial incentives, there has been relatively little theoretical work on the determinants of shareholder intervention and its relationship with managerial pay and performance. Fluck (1998 Fluck ( , 1999 , Myers (2000) , Ruiz-Verdú (2007) and Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) have developed models in which cash flows are not contractible, so that the only constraint on managerial behavior is provided by the threat of dismissal by shareholders. 3 The model presented here, however, differs from the above models in two key respects. First and foremost, in all the above models, firm performance, though not contractible, is observable by shareholders. Therefore, the above models do not touch on one of the main issues analyzed here, which is the provision of information by management. And, second, the above papers, with the exception of Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) , focus on the threat of shareholder intervention. In this paper, however, shareholder intervention takes place in equilibrium, allowing us to derive predictions about the determinants of shareholder intervention and its relation with firm performance.
The model presented here is also related to the articles by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) , which distinguish between formal and real authority. In these papers, principals have formal authority, but real authority may be in the hands of the agent when the principal decides to merely rubber-stamp the agent's decisions. The focus in this case is how the allocation of real authority affects incentives for information acquisition. In the case of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) , ownership concentration determines the incentives of the largest shareholder to acquire information and, thus, also influences the manager's choice 3 Hart (2001) also gives an example that has these features.
of effort to acquire information.
Although different in approach, the model presented here is also related to the costlystate-verification literature (Townsend 1979; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Krasa and Villamil 2000) .
In this literature, firm performance is observable by the manager but is not verifiable unless owners incur inspection costs. Compensation is made contingent on the performance measure as reported by the manager and, in case of costly verification, on the actual performance measure as well. Firm performance is generally assumed to be independent of the manager's actions, so the goal of contract design is to elicit truthful reporting in the least costly way. In contrast with this literature, in the model developed here it is assumed that no contracts contingent onactual or reported-performance are possible. Further, the interest here is how information revelation shapes managerial incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model and Section 2 analyzes the relationship between control costs, shareholder intervention and the informativeness of shareholders' returns. Section 3, in turn, analyzes the interaction between costs of control and managerial incentives and derives the optimal level of control costs. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of the model for firm financing. Finally, 5 summarizes the results and discusses limitations and extensions of the model.
The Model
Consider a firm that lives for one period and is owned by a set of outside investors. These investors (shareholders) have the legal right to decide on all matters pertaining to the operation of the firm and are entitled to the residual earnings generated by it. The operation of the firm is, however, delegated to a manager with no significant ownership stake in the firm. For simplicity, this ownership stake will be assumed to be zero. Although shareholders could, in principle, design a contract to provide incentives to the manager, I will assume that no such contract is enforceable, since the manager is able to, legally, alter the terms of the contract at will.
The model has the following stages, which are summarized in Figure 1: 1. The manager chooses an action a ∈ {b, g}. Action b generates a private payoff P for the manager. Therefore, it can be interpreted as implying a lower effort level or as the choice 
This assumption can be expressed as:
Importantly, the realization of revenues is observed by the manager, but not by shareholders.
3. After observing the state s, the manager announces the profits, d s , that will be paid out to shareholders at the end of the period.
4. If shareholders are satisfied with the profits announced by the manager, they do not intervene. Otherwise, they exercise their control rights, fire the manager and hire a replacement to run the firm under direct owner oversight until the end of the period.
Replacing the manager involves costs of control c for owners. The replacement is paid a competitively determined salary µ, which is assumed, for simplicity to be zero.
5. Finally, revenues are generated and the corresponding payoffs are distributed among shareholders and the manager. If there is no intervention, shareholders receive d s , and the manager obtains the revenues that remain after profits are paid out to shareholders:
If there is intervention, the manager is fired and earns µ = 0 elsewhere. Therefore, shareholder's return from intervention is given by
Notation
In what follows, I will denote by σ a ∈ [0, 1] the probability with which the manager takes action 
Under complete information, shareholders would accept this return, intervention would not take place in equilibrium, and the manager's compensation would be:
Consider next the scenario in which shareholders know the probability distribution over outcomes, but cannot observe the firm's outcome. If we let p be the probability of firm success (that is, the probability that revenues are R H ), this scenario constitutes a signaling game, which I will label Γ(p, c). In this signaling game, depicted in Figure 3, To analyze the profit-announcement problem recall that r s = R s − c and d * s = max{r s , 0}, and let ER(p) ≡ pR H + (1 − p)R L be shareholders' returns from intervention gross of control costs. Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that:
Assumption AS.2 c < ER(γ)
Thus, if the probability of success is high enough, shareholders will intervene unless they are paid a positive profit. If we let v (d, α, s) denote the manager's expected utility from offering d in state s if α(d) = α, then the following lemma shows that the manager's preferences satisfy a single-crossing condition:
6 Equilibria are defined formally in the appendix. Imposing the D1 criterion greatly simplifies the analysis, but tractability is not achieved at the cost of biasing the results. Comparative statics results can be derived even in I imposed weaker or no restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path. These results would be much less precise (they would refer to sets of equilibrium outcomes rather than to equilibrium outcomes) and cumbersome to derive, but would have the same signs as the ones derived below.
Lemma 1 shows that the manager's preferences satisfy a single crossing condition, since it expected utility increases as we move towards the origin.
To derive the equilibria of Γ(p, c), notice that investors will never intervene if offered a profit d * H or higher. Further, the manager in state H will always prefer paying d * H (or slightly more) and avoiding intervention than facing certain intervention. It follows that the manager will announce a profit d < d * H with positive probability in state
H , for shareholders to set α(d) < 1, the manager in state L must be setting d with positive probability as well, since, otherwise, shareholders would rightly interpret d as signaling that the state is H and would intervene with probability one when faced with d. It, thus, 
, so d could not be played with positive probability in equilibrium by the manager in state L. Figure 5 illustrates the argument.
Finally, the D1 requirement and Lemma 1 imply that at any equilibrium, the manager in state L must set d * L , since, otherwise, she would have profitable deviations. To see this, note
) would be a profitable deviation, since the D1 criterion requires that such a profit should be interpreted by shareholders as having been set by the manager in state L. This follows from Lemma 1, which implies that if a deviation from d to d < d is profitable for the manager in state H, it is also profitable for the manager in state L, but there will be levels of the probability of intervention such that deviating to d is profitable for the manager in state L but not in state H, as illustrated by Figure 6 . Therefore, equilibria can only be of three types: either i) the manager in both states sets With this definition, we can state the main result of this section (all proofs are in the appendix, except otherwise noted).
φ is such that
φ(d) = p σ H (d) p σ H (d) + (1 − p) σ L (d) (9) whenever p σ H (d) + (1 − p) σ L (d) > 0,
Proposition 1 Let the perfect Bayesian equilibria of
and
If c = ER(p), then there are multiple equilibria with
Proposition 1 shows that the degree of pooling increases with c. For low values of c (c < R L ) the manager announces a different profit level in each state, so full separation obtains. As c increases, the manager in state H starts offering d * L with a positive probability, which is also increasing in c. Finally, when costs of control exceed the ex ante expected return from intervention, the manager sets d * L = 0 in both states. Therefore the sensitivity of announced profits to actual performance, or, put differently, the amount of information about the firm's state conveyed by the manager's profit announcement, is decreasing in c.
In contrast to the complete information scenario, Proposition 1 also shows that whenever the return from intervention is ex ante expected to be positive (ER(p) > c), in equilibrium, there is always a positive probability of intervention. The following corollary shows how the probability of intervention in each state, the ex ante probability of intervention and the expected costs of intervention are related to the level of control costs. Before stating the corollary, let (p, c) denote the expected costs of intervention.
i is nonincreasing in c.

If 0 < c < ER(p), then EC(p, c) > 0 and EC is increasing in c. If c > ER(p), then
The first part of Corollary 1 states that, as long as the ex ante return from intervention is higher than the costs of control, the equilibrium probability of intervention is positive. Further, the probability of intervention in the bad state is always greater or equal than in the good state.
If the ex ante return from intervention is lower than the costs of control (so shareholders would never intervene on the basis of the prior distribution alone), the probability of intervention drops down to zero in both states as the manager sets d * L = 0 in both states. The second part of the Corollary shows that the probability of intervention is weakly decreasing in the level of control costs. This relationship, however, is not continuous and has three distinct regions, as can be seen in Figure 7 . For c low enough (c ≤ R L ), the probability of intervention falls with c. For higher values of c (R L < c < ER(p)), the probability of intervention is constant in c, with the reduction in i L being compensated on average by the increase in i H . Finally, when intervention becomes unprofitable ex ante for any profit announcement (c > ER(p)), the probability of intervention falls to zero. While the negative relationship between the probability of intervention and the costs of control suggests that the expected cost of intervention could fall as c increases, the third part of Corollary 1 shows that this is only the case if the increase in c makes intervention ex ante unprofitable for shareholders for any d. Otherwise, the expected cost of intervention actually increases with c, since the probability of intervention falls less than one-to-one as c grows.
The results in this section can, thus, be summarized as follows. For the range of control costs for which shareholder intervention may occur in equilibrium, that is, for c < ER(p): 1) the sensitivity of shareholders' returns to actual performance falls with c; 2) there is always a positive probability of intervention; 3) the probability of intervention is higher in the bad state; 4) the probability of intervention is weakly decreasing in c; and 5) the expected cost of intervention is increasing in c.
Managerial Incentives
The previous section analyzed the effects of control costs on the probability of shareholder intervention and the returns obtained by both the manager and shareholders, taking as given the probability of success. Since this probability is determined by the manager's first-stage action, I was, thus, abstracting from potential incentive effects of the costs of control. To analyze these incentive effects, in the present section, I derive the equilibrium of the full game Γ(c), whose extensive form is depicted in Figure 2 .
Let EV (σ a , σ L , σ H , α) be the manager's expected utility given her probability of choosing action g, her profit announcement policy, and shareholders' intervention policy:
where V (σ L , σ H , α, s) is the manager's expected utility if the state is s, the manager's profit announcement policy is (σ L , σ H ) and shareholders' intervention strategy is α. Then, for the full game Γ(c), we can define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satisfies the D1 criterion as follows: 
Inspection of the above definition and of the definition of an equilibrium of Γ(p, c) given in the previous section shows that an equilibrium of Γ can be alternatively defined as:
In other words, the structure of the game allows us to solve the profit announcement-setting and the action choice stages separately. To derive the equilibrium of Γ(c), we can propose a first-stage behavior strategy σ a and check if it is optimal given the continuation payoffs implied by the equilibrium of the game Γ(p, c), with p = σ a γ +(1−σ a )π. 8 This procedure works because the manager's action choice in the first stage determines the probability of success for the firm, but has no other effect on payoffs. Therefore, the equilibrium play in the dividend-setting stage (that is, in game Γ(p, c)) depends upon the manager's action choice only through the effect of this action choice on shareholders' equilibrium beliefs.
Therefore, the manager will take action g with positive probability in equilibrium only if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
where V * s (p, c) is the equilibrium expected utility of the signaling game Γ(p, c).
It is important to notice that the expected utility on the right-hand side of the above expression is the one that would follow from taking action b if the play in the continuation game was given by the equilibrium of the game Γ(γ, c) induced by the proposed equilibrium action g. To ensure that g can be an equilibrium action, we need to check that there is no profitable unilateral deviation by the manager. Since, given shareholders' strategy, it cannot be optimal for the manager to deviate from the profit announcement policies ( σ L , σ H ) that constitute an equilibrium of Γ(γ, c), to ensure that there are no profitable deviations from equilibrium, it suffices to check (IC).
Letting ∆(p, c) denote the difference between the expected compensation in the high-and low-revenue states if shareholders expect the probability of state H to be p:
and letting 
Lemma 2 has several implications. First and foremost, it shows that ∆(p, c) is increasing in c for any p. In particular, this means that ∆(γ, c), the difference between the expected compensation in the good and bad states if the manager takes the efficient action (and shareholders expect her to take that action) is increasing in c, since the ratio and faces a positive probability of intervention i L , so that her payoff is (1 − i L )c. Therefore, if changes in c did not affect the probability of intervention, the effect of a marginal increase in c would be to increase the expected compensation only by (1 − i L ). Even though increases in c do reduce the probability of intervention, the marginal increase of the manager's expected utility in the bad state caused by a marginal increase in c is still less than 1. When c is larger
, if the manager takes action g, she also faces a positive equilibrium probability of intervention in the good state, but her expected utility if that state is realized is still c (notice that this must be the case if the manager is to randomize between d * L and d * H , since the latter dividend yields a payoff of c). If the manager takes action g and the bad state is realized, her expected compensation is again lower than c and also increases less than one-to-one when c increases. Therefore, for any value of c in the relevant range, ∆(γ, c) is increasing in c, which seems to imply that the benefit for the manager of taking the efficient action and giving up the private benefits P increases with c. In other words, Lemma 2 suggests that the manager's incentives to take the efficient action are stronger for larger values of c.
There is an intuitive explanation for this possibility. As it was shown in the previous section, increases in c increase the amount of pooling in the equilibrium of Γ(p, c), in the sense that they reduce the difference between the expected profit paid out to owners in the good and bad states. Now, if the difference between the expected dividends paid in the two states falls, the manager's expected compensation becomes more sensitive to the firm's actual performance, which should strengthen the manager's incentives to take the efficient action. In the limit (as c approaches ER(γ)), the manager pays out the same profit to shareholders in both states, thus becoming the de facto residual earner. Therefore, the incentives to take the efficient action increase with c and become maximal when c approaches ER(γ).
Inspection of Lemma 2 also shows that when the return from intervention is greater than control costs even when the manager takes the inefficient action b (ER(π) > c), the manager's expected payoffs in equilibrium are independent of p. Therefore, the difference between the manager's payoff in the good and bad states, ∆(p, c), is also independent of p. When the return from intervention if the manager takes the inefficient action b is lower than the costs of control (ER(π) < c), shareholders will never intervene if they know that the manager has taken action b. In such a case, the manager is able to appropriate all revenues and the difference between the payoffs in the two states becomes maximal. It, thus, follows from Lemma 2 that The following proposition describes the manager's equilibrium first-stage action choice as a function of the costs of control c. Abusing notation, I will let a * denote the equilibrium action choice if the manager takes one of the two actions with probability one:
Proposition 2 For any parameter values there is a c > 0 such that:
If c < ER(π):
(a) If c < c, then a * = b. (b) If c = c, then σ * a ∈ [0, 1]. (c) If c > c, then a * = g.
If c ≥ ER(π): (a) If c < c and c ≤ ER(π), then a * = b. (b) If c < c and c > ER(π), then σ
Inspection of Proposition 2 shows that the probability with which the manager takes the efficient action is nondecreasing in c. In other words, higher levels of control costs lead to better managerial incentives, which, as stated in the next corollary, translate into a higher probability of success for the firm:
Corollary 2 The equilibrium probability of success is nondecreasing in c.
This result, together with Corollary 1, which showed that, for a given p, the equilibrium probability of intervention was nonincreasing in c implies the following result:
Corollary 3 Let i * be the equilibrium probability of intervention. Then i * is nonincreasing in c.
The above two corollaries state that when control costs increase, the probability of the efficient action increases and the probability of costly intervention decreases. However, from here it cannot be inferred that the net effect of an increase in control costs on total value is positive, since expected costs of intervention may increase with c. Corollary 1 showed that, for a fixed p, expected costs of intervention are increasing in c. Therefore, if an increase in c does not have any effect on the manager's action choice, then the probability of success will not change and expected costs of intervention will go up as a response to the increase in c, so that total surplus will fall with c. If, however, the increase in c leads the manager to increase the probability of taking the efficient action, it may increase total surplus by increasing expected revenues and, perhaps, by reducing the expected costs of intervention as well, since increases in the probability of success reduce the probability of costly intervention. The following proposition describes how total expected surplus changes with c.
Proposition 3 Let ES(c) = ER(p * (c)) − EC(c). Then:
1. ES has two local maxima, one at c = 0 and one at c = c.
ES is maximized at c = c if and only if
Proposition 3 shows that there are two locally optimal scenarios. When control costs are zero, the manager takes the inefficient action, so that the probability of success for the firm is low and the probability of intervention high. In this scenario, expected revenues are low and managerial turnover high, but the surplus net of intervention costs is relatively high because intervention is cheap.
The other locally optimal scenario takes place when control costs are at, or slightly above, c. In this scenario, the manager takes the efficient action so that the probability of firm success is high and the probability of intervention low. When intervention happens, however, it is relatively costly.
Which of the two local optima is a global optima depends on the severity of the conflict of interest between the manager and shareholders (as measured by P ) and on the impact that the manager's action has on expected revenues. A sufficient condition for c to be the global maximum is γ ≥ 1+π 2 . For example, for plausible parameter values like γ = .7 and π = .3, the optimal control cost would be c.
Firm Financing
In the previous section, it was shown that it may be optimal, from the viewpoint of efficiency, for shareholders to face a positive level of control costs. If greater control costs reduce shareholders' returns, however, shareholders may not want to contribute funds to the firm to finance its operation. To analyze the relationship between control costs and the firm's ability to obtain financing, consider an initial period prior to the stages considered so far, in which a risk-neutral entrepreneur seeks to obtain I monetary units from outside investors to set up a firm. The choices open to the entrepreneur if she obtains financing and the consequences of those choices are as described in previous sections. Analyzing the firm's financing stage also provides a closure to the model, by specifying how the manager acquired her position.
In this setting, if shareholders can predict the equilibrium play of Γ(c), their expected payoff contingent on the level of control costs, EU S (c), will be given by the expected payoff induced by the equilibrium strategies. If the capital market is competitive and the relevant reservation rate of return is given by ρ, shareholders will be willing to contribute exactly P E , given by:
Assuming, for simplicity, that ρ = 0, the entrepreneur will obtain financing if and only if
To assess the effect of control costs on the entrepreneur's ability to raise funds, we thus have to compute how EU S varies with c. The results of previous sections suggest that EU S will be decreasing in c for those values of control costs for which changes in c do not influence the manager's action choice, since, for those values of control costs, the only effect of an increase in c would be to reduce the dividends obtained by shareholders in each state. If increases in c lead the manager to take the efficient action, however, they can increase shareholders' returns by increasing the probability of success, even if they reduce the profit paid to shareholders in each state. Therefore, we can expect EU s to be large enough to allow financing even for relatively large c. In fact, as it happens with total value, EU s will have two local maxima, one at c = 0 and one at c, and it can be the case that EU s is maximized at c. Rather than analyzing all possible scenarios, consider the following example to illustrate this possibility. Suppose that
ER(π) < I < ER(γ)
, so that financing is not possible unless the manager takes the efficient action, and suppose that ∆ <
, a condition that ensures that the threshold control cost level c is lower than R L (this scenario is chosen solely for simplicity). In this case, it follows from Proposition 2 and the assumption that ER(π) < I that it is not possible for the entrepreneur to raise funds unless c ≥ c. In other words, in this case the entrepreneur is not able to raise funds if the level of control costs is too low. To check whether financing is possible for c ≥ c, it suffices to check that EU s (c) ≥ I. Letting EU * s (c) be the maximum equilibrium expected returns when control costs are c, it follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that
Therefore, if
then financing will be possible for c = c. If the inequality is strict, financing will be possible for c ∈ [c,ĉ] , whereĉ is such that EU * s (ĉ) = I. Since (21) can hold with slack given the assumptions made, the example shows that for (reasonable) parameter values, financing may only be possible for a range of control costs bounded away from zero. In other words, a positive level of control costs may not only be compatible, but, actually, necessary for the entrepreneur to obtain financing.
Concluding Remarks
There has recently been much discussion about reforming corporate governance to facilitate shareholder intervention and control executive compensation. There is, however, little theoretical work that investigates shareholder intervention and its effects on managerial pay and incentives. In this paper, I present a model that addresses these issues. In the model, there is a double moral hazard problem. On the one hand, the firm's manager takes an unobserved action that determines the firm's expected cash flows. On the other hand, the manager decides how much of the non-verifiable cash flows to keep for herself and how much to pay out to shareholders as profits. In the absence of contracts that link the manager's pay to performance, the only limit to managerial rent extraction is shareholder intervention. Intervention, however, faces two obstacles. First, it involves substantial costs, which are incurred by shareholders.
And second, shareholders must base their intervention decision on information about the firm's state that is provided by the manager. In this context, I investigate how shareholders' power to replace the manager (as measured by the cost of shareholder intervention) determines the probability of intervention, the information carried by the manager's profit announcements, and the manager's pay and incentives. Increasing shareholder power has the effect of making intervention more likely in equilibrium. Further, it leads to more truthful reporting of the firm's state by the manager. Greater shareholder power, however, also has the effect of weakening the manager's incentives to maximize value.
Given the different effects of increasing shareholder power, the relation between shareholder power and welfare is not clear a priori. The model shows that this relation is not monotonous, with two locally optimal levels of shareholder power. One local optimum involves maximum shareholder power, frequent intervention, low managerial pay, and low expected cash flows because of weak managerial incentives. At the other local optimum, shareholder intervention is very costly and infrequent, and expected cash flows and managerial pay are high. The latter scenario, with low shareholder power, is globally optimal when the conflict of interest between the manager and shareholders is not too severe, or when the manager's actions have a large impact on expected cash flows.
Shareholder power does not only affect the total surplus generated by the firm, but also how that surplus is allocated ex post between managerial pay and profits. Therefore, the power that shareholders have over the manager determines their ex ante expected payoff, and, thus, their willingness to contribute their funds to the firm. The model shows how the constraint that shareholders need to earn a sufficient return limits the set of feasible levels of control costs. It also shows how, for reasonable parameter values, an entrepreneur seeking to finance a project through outside equity will want to limit ex ante shareholders' power to replace her.
In this paper, I necessarily made some simplifying assumptions. Relaxing some of these assumptions appears as a promising area for future research. For example, the model makes the extreme assumption that the board serves the manager's interests, so that what is in reality a two-tier relationship (shareholders-board of directors-manager) becomes a simpler onetier relationship between shareholders and the manager. I have no doubt that incorporating the board into the model would provide additional insights. I have also assumed that it is not possible to write compensation contracts that link the manager's pay to any measure of performance. Although it is a key assumption of the model that the manager has the ability to manipulate her compensation ex post, it may be possible to retain this assumption while allowing for, at least, a limited set of contracts that can be enforced. Finally, the model has focused on a single firm, ignoring potential effects that may take place through the market for managers. Integrating managerial influence over pay and shareholder intervention within a market for managers seems a specially promising extension of the model.
A Proofs
To prove Proposition 1, I first prove the following lemmas:
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of equilibrium.
Proof. The manager's expected utility from playing
Lemma 5 
Therefore, if it is not profitable for the manager in state H to deviate to d (that is, if 
. Before stating the next lemma, the D1 criterion is defined explicitly: 9 Definition 3 (D1 Criterion) For any profit d, let:
s be the equilibrium expected utility for a manager in state s and define:
Lemma 6 In any equilibrium satisfying D1:
Proof. By Lemma 5, at any equilibrium with
9 The definition follows the one given in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , page 452.
Then, by Lemma 1
But then, there exists an > 0, such that if α = α + :
and 
Proof of Proposition 1.
For the manager in state L not to deviate:
In particular, since, in equilibrium
which can be rewritten
For the manager in state H not to deviate:
In particular:
and define α by:
. Therefore, the D1 criterion requires that for small enough, φ(d ) = 0 and, thus, that α(d ) = 0.
But this implies that there are profitable deviations for the manager. Therefore, at any equilibrium satisfying D1, it has to be the case that
Summarizing the above argument, if c ≤ R L , at any equilibrium, it has to be the case that
It is also immediate to check that the following strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium:
[ Figure goes here]
and c < ER(p) for any p.
An argument identical to the one presented above for the case c < R L would imply that, as above, the following strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium: 
that is:
On the other hand, for α(0) ∈ (0, 1), it has to be the case that
that is,
Since, in equilibrium
it follows that
Therefore, if σ H (0) = σ * H , shareholders are indifferent between intervention and accep-
It is then straightforward to check that the following strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium: σ L (0) = 1; 
Therefore, in this case there are multiple equilibria with σ H (0) = 1; σ L (0) = 1; and
Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, it follows that:
Part 1 of the corollary follows immediately from the expressions for i L , i H and i above.
Since the mapping i is a correspondence, I will use the concept of nondecreasing for set- Letting EC (p, c) = ci(p, c) , it follows immediately that EC(p, c) is nondecreasing in c in the interval (0, ER(p)) (since both
If R L < c < ER(p), the manager in state H randomizes between d * L = 0 and d * H , so that her expected utility must be equal to the expected utility from setting
can fully describe ∆ as a function (correspondence) of p and c as follows: 
and φ as described in Proposition 1. Thus, when Γ(p * ) has a unique equilibrium, I will omit any discussion of (σ * L , σ * H , α * ) or φ * . For those cases in which Γ(p * ) has multiple equilibria, I will clarify which of the ( σ L , σ H , α) can be part of an equilibrium of Γ. For c = ER(π), then p(c) = π. Therefore, it follows from (48) that for any p > π, 
which requires
which, by (50), holds if c > ER(π).
for these values of c there are no pure strategy equilibria. Now, for an equilibrium in mixed strategies to exist, we need ∆(p, c) = ∆, which requires p = p(c). Therefore, the manager's first-stage behavior strategy has to be such that:
where Further, inspection of Proposition 2 shows that for c = c, there is always an equilibrium
, α * * ) such that σ * * a = 1 and α * * is the minimum equilibrium value of α * (d * L ). Therefore, at this equilibrium, p * * (c) = γ and the probability of intervention is equal to i * m (c). It follows that the maximum expected surplus given c is obtained at this equilibrium and 
The proof of Corollary 3 shows that i * m (c) < i * (c ). Therefore, ES M (c) − ES(c ) > 0 for k low enough, so that c is a local maximum of ES. Since there are no local maxima other than c = 0, this proves the first part of the Proposition for the case c ≤ R L . Now, from the proof of Corollary 3:
where the last equality comes from ∆ m (c) =
R H −R L +c (expression (49)) and ∆ m (c) = ∆.
Therefore,
Thus, given the definition of ∆: 
(expression (49)) and ∆ m (c) = ∆.
Therefore, . Therefore, for c ∈ (ER(π), c): 
Further Probabilities of intervention as a function of c. i L is the probability of intervention in the bad state, i H is the probability of intervention in the good state, and i, the ex ante probability of intervention. v(d, α, L) > v(d , α(d ), L) and v(d, α, H) < v(d , α(d ) , H). For example, the pair (d, α ) in the figure is such that v (d, α , L) > v(d , α(d ), L) and v(d, α , H) < v(d , α(d ) , H). Therefore, D1 requires that
